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Abstract 1 
Many animals, including humans, acquire information through social learning. Although 2 
such information can be acquired easily, its potential unreliability means it should not be 3 
used indiscriminately. Cultural ‘transmission biases’ may allow individuals to weigh their 4 
reliance on social information according to a model’s characteristics. In one of the first 5 
studies to juxtapose two of these context dependent model-based biases, we investigated 6 
whether the age and knowledge state of a model affected the fidelity of children’s 7 
copying. Eighty-five 5-year-old children watched a video demonstration of either an adult 8 
or child, who had professed either knowledge or ignorance regarding a tool-use task, 9 
extract a reward from that task using both causally relevant and irrelevant actions. 10 
Relevant actions were imitated faithfully by children regardless of the model’s 11 
characteristics, but those who observed an adult reproduced more irrelevant actions than 12 
those who observed a child, while the professed knowledge state of the model showed a 13 
weaker effect on imitation of irrelevant actions. Overall, children favoured the use of a 14 
‘copy adults’ bias over a ‘copy task-knowledgeable individual’ bias, even though the 15 
latter could potentially have provided more reliable information. The use of such social 16 
learning strategies has significant implications for understanding the phenomenon of 17 
imitation of irrelevant actions (or overimitation), instances of maladaptive information 18 
cascades and for understanding cumulative culture.   19 
Keywords: imitation, transmission biases, social learning strategies, model 20 
characteristics, knowledge state.  21 
Running Head: INVESTIGATING CONTEXT TRANSMISSION BIASES  
2 
 
1. Introduction 22 
 23 
The adaptive value of social learning is now evident in a vast range of animals, 24 
from humans to insects, resulting in implications for our understanding of cultural 25 
evolution and social intelligence (Boyd & Richerson 1985; Tennie et al., 2009; Whiten & 26 
van Schaik 2007). When acquiring information individuals face evolutionary trade-offs 27 
between the acquisition of costly but accurate personal information and the use of cheap 28 
but potentially less reliable social information (Boyd & Richerson 1985; Kendal et al., 29 
2005). Accordingly, the implementation of social information should be determined by 30 
an evaluation of the content of the information presented and the characteristics of the 31 
information provider, the model (e.g. van Bergen et al., 2004; Rendell et al., 2010). 32 
Nevertheless, the transmission of information from one individual to another has resulted 33 
in the accumulation of errors or cascades of misinformation (Rieucau & Giraldeau 2009; 34 
Tanaka et al. 2009). For example, humans copy non-functional attributes (Mesoudi & 35 
O’Brien, 2008), with maladaptive behaviors passing between individuals within groups 36 
(McGuigan & Graham, 2009; Whiten & Flynn, 2010).  37 
 38 
Furthermore humans copy actions that, at face value, appear to be causally 39 
irrelevant (Horner & Whiten, 2005; Lyons et al., 2007; McGuigan et al., 2007). The 40 
propensity to copy these irrelevant actions appears in different cultures (e.g. Kalahari 41 
Bushmen; Nielsen & Tomaselli, 2010), increases with age (McGuigan et al., 2007; 42 
Neilsen, 2006) into adulthood(McGuigan, Makinson & Whiten, 2010), and persists 43 
despite interventions such as reinforcement for the identification of irrelevant actions and 44 
direct instructions to only copy relevant actions (Lyons et al., 2007, 2011). Such 45 
pervasiveness has led some to view copying irrelevant actions as, ‘an evolutionary 46 
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adaption that is fundamental to the development and transmission of human culture’ 47 
(Nielsen & Tomaselli, 2010, p.729). For example, Henrik and Csibra (2009) argue that 48 
imitating causally irrelevant elements of tool use demonstrations helps children acquire 49 
means actions even before they fully understand their causal role in bringing about the 50 
desired goal. If one does not know the whether an action is causally necessary it may be 51 
adaptive to copy this action.  52 
 53 
Copying seemingly causally irrelevant actions could only be adaptive if 54 
individuals develop flexible strategies that dictate the circumstances under which they 55 
copy others. Theoretical models have explicitly considered a demonstrator’s 56 
characteristics, which have been termed ‘who strategies’ (Laland, 2004) and ‘cultural 57 
transmission biases’ (Boyd & Richerson 1985; Rendell et al. 2011). According to Boyd 58 
and Richerson (1985) individuals may employ an indirect bias towards learning from a 59 
model with specific preferential characteristics. These indirect biases or context-60 
dependent (Henrich & McElreath, 2003) model-based biases, may involve, for example, 61 
an individual’s age.  Using such model-based biases allows populations to approach 62 
adaptive optima much faster than they otherwise would under individual learning or 63 
‘guided variation’ (Boyd & Richerson, 1985). For example, Mesoudi and O’Brien (2008)  64 
found, by simulating the cultural transmission of prehistoric projectile-points, that the 65 
population-level pattern observed in Nevada’s archaeological record was consistent with 66 
a bias of wholesale copying of a successful hunter’s projectile-point design, including 67 
non-functional but selectively neutral aspects (such as color), rather than copying 68 
particular projectile-point attributes.  69 
 70 
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In an argument analogous to that of Laland (2004) regarding the relative 71 
abundance of cognitively challenging versus simpler social learning strategies in the 72 
animal kingdom, we argue that within a species there may be differences in the 73 
propensity to use certain model-based biases. Specifically, children may find a ‘copy 74 
adult over child’ strategy (Dugatkin & Godin, 1993) relatively easy to implement 75 
compared to a ‘copy task-knowledgeable individual’ strategy (Henrich & Broesch, 2011) 76 
for a number of reasons. Firstly, understanding of age develops earlier than an 77 
understanding of knowledge (Edwards, 1984; Wellman et al., 2001) and thus related 78 
biases may also develop earlier. Secondly, age may be a more salient characteristic and 79 
thus involve less cognitive processing and, thirdly, children may understand that self-80 
declared knowledge states may be less reliable than age. In the current study five-year-81 
old children received demonstrations of observably relevant and irrelevant actions in 82 
relation to the goal of extracting a reward from an artificial fruit and we investigated 83 
whether the observing child’s subsequent behavior was influenced by the model’s age 84 
and/or knowledge state. 85 
 86 
The model-based bias of age, and the strategy of ‘copy older individuals’ is a 87 
prominent heuristic (Henrich & Gil-White, 2000; Kirkpatrick & Dugatkin, 1994). There 88 
is evidence that older models elicit more social learning in many species (e.g. seals; 89 
Sanvito et al., 2007, mice; Choleris et al., 1997,  guppies; Amalacher & Dugatkin 2005, 90 
chimpanzees; Biro et al., 2003; Horner et al., 2010). Likewise, human developmental 91 
research has considered model age as a determining factor in social learning for some 92 
time. Vygotsky (1981) suggested that children learn more from older individuals as they 93 
scaffold learning, with an active intention of sharing their knowledge. Observational 94 
studies have shown that younger (1- to 2-year-olds) siblings imitated their older (3- to 5-95 
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year-old) siblings far more than the other way around regardless of age gap or sex 96 
differences (Abramovitch et al., 1980; Pepler et al., 1981). When presented with two 97 
models of differing ages (two years younger, same age, or two years older) 98 
simultaneously, eight year olds imitate the food preference choice of older and same age 99 
peers over younger peers (Brody & Stoneham, 1981). Similarly, when the two models 100 
presented were a child and an adult, three- and four-year-olds preferentially used 101 
information provided by an adult over a child, for word learning (Jaswal & Neely, 2006) 102 
and simple rule games, interpreting the adult’s behavior as normative (Rakoczy et al., 103 
2010) 104 
 105 
The effect of a model’s age on children’s social learning is modulated by the 106 
content of the to-be-copied behavior; two-action, artificial fruits tasks have shown that 107 
14-month-old infants (Hanna & Meltzoff, 1993) and 3-, 4- and 5-year-old children, 108 
(Flynn & Whiten, 2008; Hopper et al., 2008, 2010) demonstrate a similar level of fidelity 109 
in the imitation of relevant actions performed by a peer to that of studies with adult 110 
models (McGuigan et al., 2007). However, studies looking at the imitation of irrelevant 111 
actions (actions that are not causally necessary for the completion of the task) show that 112 
2- and 3-year old children did not copy the irrelevant actions demonstrated by a peer to 113 
the same extent as irrelevant actions presented by an adult model (Horner & Whiten, 114 
2005; McGuigan et al., 2007).  Subsequently, McGuigan et al. (2010) explicitly 115 
investigated the effect of a model’s age on the copying of irrelevant actions. Observers of 116 
various ages (3-year-olds, 5-year-olds and adults) copied significantly more irrelevant 117 
actions when they were modelled by an adult as opposed to a 5-year-old child. It remains 118 
unclear whether this disposition indicates a bias of ‘copy adults’ or the more cognitively 119 
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complex bias of viewing a child model as ‘less rational and knowledgeable’ than an adult 120 
model (Flynn 2008, p. 3549). 121 
 122 
The effect of a model’s knowledge state on children’s social learning strategies is 123 
less clear. By five years of age children have a concept of a model’s expertise (Azmitia 124 
1988; Birch et al., 2008, 2010; Moore et al., 1989), knowledge (Koenig & Harris 2005; 125 
Sabbagh & Baldwin 2001;Wellman et al., 2001), intention to teach (Ziv et al., 2008) and 126 
infer a model’s knowledge state based on his/her age (Taylor et al.,1991). One might 127 
expect observers to rely more heavily on an individual’s demonstration when that 128 
individual has professed knowledge in the specific task domain. To test a task-directed 129 
context bias one must manipulate the model’s professed knowledge state of the specific 130 
‘test’ task. Furthermore, although there has been theoretical speculation of the existence 131 
of a hierarchy of transmission biases (McElreath et al., 2008) the interaction between 132 
biases remains unclear. We are only aware of one study investigating the interaction of 133 
copying biases of children of a model’s age and competence. In this study the 134 
competence information, exhibited in an unrelated task, outweighed age information such 135 
that children (aged 7- to 8-years-old), in order of preference, copied models of: high-136 
competence peers, high-competence younger, low-competence peers and low-137 
competence younger (Brody & Stoneman, 1985).  138 
 139 
The current study explicitly investigated the roles of two model-based biases. In 140 
the copying fidelity of children, we contrast the model age (adult versus peer model) with 141 
one that might require greater assessment, the task-directed knowledge state (task-142 
knowledgeable versus task-ignorant model). The completion of a two-action tool-use task 143 
(Dawson & Foss, 1965), which included causally relevant and irrelevant components, 144 
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was demonstrated by one of four models differing with respect to these biases. We 145 
predicted that: (1) an observer who witnessed a model successfully extract a reward from 146 
a task would imitate the relevant actions demonstrated using the same means to extract 147 
the reward regardless of that model’s characteristics. (2) In line with McGuigan et al. 148 
(2010), children who witness an adult model would exhibit higher levels of imitation of 149 
causally irrelevant actions than those who witness a child model. (3) Children faced with 150 
a task-knowledgeable model would show higher levels of imitation of causally irrelevant 151 
actions than those presented with a task-ignorant model. Finally, (4) in line with Brody & 152 
Stoneman (1985), there would be a hierarchy of transmission with a task-knowledgeable 153 
adult prompting the highest, and a task-ignorant child prompting the lowest, levels of 154 
imitation of irrelevant actions, with potential differences between the two other models 155 
allowing the hierarchy of biases to be examined further. 156 
 157 
2. Method 158 
 159 
2.1 Participants 160 
Ninety-six 5-year-old children (45 males, M = 65 months, standard deviation, SD 161 
= 3.5 months) from schools in County Durham participated. There were no significant 162 
differences for sex (χ21, 96= 2.29, p = .97) or age (F8,87= 80.1, p = .60) across the 163 
experimental conditions and the no model control. 164 
 165 
2.2 Materials 166 
A two-action task, the transparent version of the ‘Glass Ceiling Box’ (GCB; see 167 
Figure 1,  Flynn, 2008; McGuigan &Graham 2009; Horner & Whiten, 2005; McGuigan 168 
et al., 2007; McGuigan et al., 2010) was used. The GCB is a transparent box with an 169 
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opening at the front that can be revealed by sliding or lifting a door. The goal is to 170 
retrieve a Velcro-backed sticker reward from a tube located behind the door, by inserting 171 
a stick tool (a 22 cm rod with Velcro on the end) into the tube. The demonstrated actions 172 
directed to the door at the front of the GCB are causally necessary to retrieve the reward. 173 
The GCB has a further opening in the roof, covered by a two-bolt defence that can be 174 
removed by poking or dragging them from the opening with the stick tool. This hole 175 
leads to an empty compartment with a ‘glass ceiling’ preventing physical access to the 176 
reward, so actions directed to the bolts or the upper compartment are observably causally 177 
irrelevant to retrieving the reward.  178 
 179 
Insert Figure 1 here 180 
 181 
2.3 Design 182 
A between-groups design was used, with children (N = 85) randomly allocated to 183 
one of four conditions pertaining to model characteristics (adult professing knowledge, 184 
adult professing ignorance, 5-year-old child professing knowledge and 5-year-old child 185 
professing ignorance) or a no model control (N = 11). The control group was relatively 186 
small as the GCB has been administered in several experiments (Flynn, 2008; McGuigan 187 
& Graham, 2009; Horner & Whiten, 2005; McGuigan et al., 2007; McGuigan et al., 188 
2010) with controls showing similar levels of interaction and success as shown in the 189 
current experiment. Both models were female and unknown to the participants. After 190 
observing a video of the model’s initial entrance and profession of knowledge or 191 
ignorance about task completion, participants watched one of two video demonstrations 192 
of the reward being extracted from the GCB. These clips were identical regardless of the 193 
model’s characteristic and counterbalanced across conditions; the only difference being 194 
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in the depiction of different methods (method 1, poke-bolts-then-slide-door, and method 195 
2, drag-bolts-then-lift-door). As participants had more than one response trial, there was a 196 
within-groups variable of trial number (T1 and T2). In the no-model control condition 197 
children were presented with the GCB without witnessing any demonstration.  198 
 199 
2.4 Procedure 200 
Children were tested individually in a quiet place in their school. Each child sat at 201 
a table in front of a laptop computer with the GCB on an adjoining table. The child was 202 
told “Today I have brought in this toy. This is a video of me showing the toy to Emma. 203 
Watch closely and listen carefully. “The child then watched an introduction to one of the 204 
video demonstrations in which the model walked into a room, looked at the GCB and 205 
turned to the camera professing either knowledge “I know this game, I’ve played with it 206 
lots of times, I know exactly how to do this” or ignorance “This is a new game, I have 207 
never seen it before, I don’t know how to do it.” Children watched this introduction twice 208 
and after each viewing were asked “Had Emma seen the game before? Did she know how 209 
to do it?” By the second viewing all participants answered correctly.  210 
 211 
Then the child was told “We asked Emma to play with the box and recorded what 212 
happened.” Following this, children watched one of two video demonstrations of a 213 
sequence of actions being carried out on the GCB, with either method 1 or method 2 214 
being used. Unlike McGuigan et al. (2010), these latter video clips of demonstration 215 
showed only the hands and arms of a petite adult. Thus any difference in participant’s 216 
behavior was due to model characteristics alone and not the physical differences in the 217 
demonstration (e.g. motor coordination) or ostensive cues. Twenty adults, blind to the 218 
study, watched the video clips. At the end they were asked who performed the actions. 219 
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All labelled the demonstrations as desired, with those seeing a child at the beginning 220 
labelling the demonstration as having been performed by a child and those who witnessed 221 
an adult at the beginning attributing the actions to an adult. 222 
 223 
The sequence of actions was as follows: the tool was used to remove two bolts on 224 
top of the GCB either by poking or dragging, the tool was inserted into the top hole and 225 
the glass ceiling tapped three times (totalling five irrelevant actions), a door at the front of 226 
the GCB was moved by either sliding or lifting it, the tool was inserted and a sticker 227 
removed. Children watched the video demonstration of the sequence of actions twice and 228 
were then told “I would like you to play with the toy. There is no right or wrong. I just 229 
want to see you play.” The child was allowed to interact with the GCB (T1) until (s)he 230 
retrieved the reward successfully or three minutes had elapsed. If required, children were 231 
given a prompt “You can play with it as much as you like.” Each child was then shown 232 
the demonstration clip a third time and allowed a further attempt (T2).  233 
 234 
In the no-model condition each child was told “Lots of children have played with 235 
this toy today and now I would like you to play with it.” They received three minutes 236 
with the GCB and were given the same prompt as the experimental group. All children 237 
were rewarded with a sticker for their participation, regardless of the outcome. 238 
 239 
2.5 Analysis 240 
Each participant’s performance was scored on four variables, i) whether (s)he 241 
successfully removed the sticker, ii) whether (s)he opened the door and if so, the method 242 
used, iii) whether (s)he removed the ‘irrelevant’ bolts and if so, the method used and, iv) 243 
how many irrelevant actions were copied. The experimenter coded all children’s behavior 244 
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whilst two independent observers, blind to the children’s allocated condition, coded 26% 245 
of the sample. All Cronbach’s Alpha scores were 0.96 or above, showing an excellent 246 
level of rater-reliability.  247 
 248 
3. Results 249 
The following analyses examined the level of success in obtaining the reward, 250 
fidelity to the method used for relevant (door opening) and irrelevant actions (bolt 251 
removal) and the number of irrelevant actions reproduced (out of five). All of these 252 
dependent variables were compared between participants (type of model) and within 253 
participants (T1 versus T2). Children who observed a demonstration were significantly 254 
more successful at retrieving the reward at T1 (success rate = 68%, p< .005 Fishers Exact 255 
Test, FET, one tailed) than children in the control condition (18%), with a significant 256 
increase in success from T1 to T2 (McNemar Z1, 85 = -3.21, p < .001).  257 
 258 
3.1 Copying of causally relevant actions 259 
No child in the no-model control condition lifted the door, while ten slid it. The 260 
number of children in the experimental conditions who copied the door-opening method 261 
they witnessed was significantly greater than chance with 78% copying the method at T1 262 
2(1, N = 60) = 26.67, p< .001) and 76% at T2 2(1, N = 74) = 13.84, p< .001). Our first 263 
hypothesis was that model characteristics would not affect the copying of causally 264 
relevant actions. To test this we ran a multi-level logistic regression of relevant actions 265 
across T1 and T2 with corrected standard errors to account for the dependence between a 266 
child’s T1 and T2 behavior. Model age, model knowledge state and demonstration 267 
witnessed (slide or lift) were the predictors and copying of action witnessed was the 268 
dependent variable. Age and knowledge state were not significant predictors of the 269 
Running Head: INVESTIGATING CONTEXT TRANSMISSION BIASES  
12 
 
imitation of the relevant method. Demonstration witnessed (lift or slide) was the only 270 
significant predictor (see Table 1). Children copied the door-slide method more than the 271 
door-lift method (97%copied slide, 51% lift).  272 
 273 
Table 1 about here 274 
 275 
3.2 Copying of causally irrelevant actions 276 
Only two children in the control condition produced an action directed to the 277 
(causally irrelevant) bolts, both poking them, and none tapped the tool into the upper 278 
compartment. Thus, children who observed a demonstration performed significantly 279 
more irrelevant actions at T1 (M = 1.55, SD = 1.74, t34 = -1.28, p<.001) than control 280 
children (M = 0.27, SD = 0.65)
1
. In the experimental conditions, the number of children 281 
who copied the bolt removal method witnessed was significantly greater than chance at 282 
T1 2 (1, N = 48) = 16.33, p< .001) and T2 2 (1, N = 90) = 11.53, p< .002). As the bolt 283 
method witnessed did not affect the total number of irrelevant actions performed at T1 284 
(t83 = -1.54, p = .13) or T2 (t83 = -1.61, p = .11) the data was collapsed across methods.   285 
It was hypothesised that children would imitate more irrelevant actions when they 286 
were presented by an adult as opposed to a child and when presented by a self-reported 287 
knowledgeable model as opposed to an ignorant model. To test this we conducted a 288 
Poisson regression analysis of irrelevant actions, using joint modelling with robust 289 
standard errors to account for the dependence between a child’s T1 and T2 behavior, with 290 
model age, model knowledge state, participant age and participant sex as predictors. 291 
Participant age and sex were not significant predictors. As expected model age was a 292 
significant predictor (adult model, M = 2.64, SD = 1.79, child model M = 1.79, SD = 293 
                                                 
1Baseline behavior comparisons are made between the children in the control group and 
the experimental children at T1 only, as by T2 the children had experience with the GCB. 
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1.90, p< 0.05), but, contrary to expectation, knowledge state was not (see Table 2 and 294 
Figure 2). Thus, whilst children who witnessed an ignorant model produced fewer (M = 295 
1.71, SD = 1.78) irrelevant actions than children who witnessed a knowledgeable model 296 
(M = 2.05, SD = 1.89, p = 0.18) this difference was not significant.  297 
 298 
Insert Table 2 about here 299 
 300 
Pairwise comparisons of the four conditions (1. knowledgeable adult, 301 
2.knowledgeable child, 3. ignorant adult, 4. ignorant child)  showed that whilst children 302 
presented with the child-ignorant model performed significantly fewer irrelevant actions 303 
compared to children presented with the adult-knowledgeable model (t78 = -2.55, p < .05), 304 
no other differences were significant (see Figure 2) 305 
 306 
Insert Figure 2 about here 307 
 308 
Post-hoc analysis 309 
Overall children produced significantly more irrelevant actions at T2 (M = 2.21 310 
SD = 1.89) than T1 (M = 1.55, SD = 1.74; t84 = -3.71, p <.001). This increase was 311 
significant for those who observed a knowledgeable adult (paired t-test: t19 = -2.53, p < 312 
.05, d = 0.56), and a knowledgeable child (t22 = -2.08, p < .05, d = 0.40) but not for those 313 
who observed an ignorant adult (t21 = -1.87, p = .076,  d = 0.28 ), or an ignorant child (t19 314 
= -0.98, p = .34, d = 0.28, see Figure 2), although the power for the latter two tests was 315 
low.  316 
 317 
 318 
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4. Discussion 319 
 320 
The current study extends research into cultural transmission by explicitly 321 
examining the role of, and relation between, two different model-based context 322 
dependent transmission biases: age and professed task-knowledge state. The results 323 
confirmed two of our initial predictions, (1) that children would imitate relevant actions 324 
regardless of a model’s age and knowledge state, and (2) that children would imitate 325 
more causally irrelevant actions produced by an adult than a peer. Our third and fourth 326 
predictions, (3) that children would use a task-directed bias to imitate irrelevant actions 327 
produced by a task-knowledgeable, but not task-ignorant, model and (4) that there would 328 
be a hierarchy of transmission biases, received comparatively weaker support. 329 
 330 
 As predicted, and in line with previous findings (Flynn & Whiten 2008a, 2008b; 331 
Hanna & Meltzoff 1993; Hopper, et al., 2008, 2010), the model’s characteristics did not 332 
affect the high levels of imitation of the relevant actions. Such faithful imitation of 333 
relevant actions appears to be ‘canalisation’, where the various possibilities for 334 
manipulating a task are reduced after a social demonstration (Flynn & Whiten, 2008b; 335 
Hopper et al., 2010; Horner, et al., 2006). This is clearly illustrated by the 46% of 336 
children who observed the door of the GCB being lifted and produced a lift action despite 337 
the availability of a preferred more salient slide method.  338 
 339 
We posit that young children exhibit a social learning strategy (Laland, 2004) of 340 
‘faithfully copy adults’ as although they faithfully copied relevant actions from both peers 341 
and adults, they copied significantly more irrelevant actions when demonstrated by an 342 
adult versus a peer. The demonstrations were presented on video, and all children 343 
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witnessed the same pair of hands manipulating the task, regardless of condition, so the 344 
bias we witness for children to copy an adult over a peer was not due to any ostensive 345 
cues present in the demonstration. Such a finding is in line with McGuigan et al. (2010) 346 
who found similar results with three- and five-year-old children. In contrast to Mesoudi 347 
& O’Brien’s (2009) findings where a ‘wholesale copy all’ model-based bias including 348 
neutral irrelevant actions was found, the irrelevant actions in the current study entailed a 349 
cost, in terms of delaying reward acquisition. This demonstrates the potential power of 350 
such transmission biases to establish maladaptive information cascades, sometimes at the 351 
population level (Bikhchandani et al., 1998; Henrich & McElreath, 2003).  352 
 353 
A task-directed bias of ‘copy task-knowledgeable individuals’ did not override the 354 
tendency to copy adults, despite the fact that the children in the current study could 355 
correctly identify the model’s knowledge state. In contrast, when Brody & Stoneman, 356 
(1985) juxtaposed peer age and competence (on an unrelated task), a competence bias 357 
outweighed any age bias, such that younger peer/high-competence models were preferred 358 
over same-age peers/low competence ones. Whether this difference in results is due to the 359 
model’s ages (adult and child model versus younger and same age peer model), 360 
reputation (knowledge state versus reliability) or medium of competency (self-declared in 361 
a video clip versus a description given by an adult experimenter) are unclear but seem 362 
ripe for further exploration.  363 
 364 
Whilst the regression model of irrelevant actions indicated that knowledge state 365 
was not a significant predictor the pairwise comparisons of all four model types 366 
(knowledgeable adult, ignorant adult, knowledgeable child, ignorant child) showed that a 367 
knowledgeable adult was copied significantly more than an ignorant child, but there were 368 
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no other significant differences between the four model types. Thus model age was 369 
weighted over professed task-knowledge, but task-knowledge was evaluated to some 370 
degree, lending some support to the idea that there is a hierarchy of transmission biases as 371 
reported by McElreath et al. (2008). Additionally post hoc analysis revealed that children 372 
who witnessed knowledgeable models regardless of age, reproduced significantly more 373 
irrelevant actions at their second attempt, than children witnessing ignorant models, who 374 
showed no change across their attempts. Taken together these results provide limited 375 
support for a knowledge-based strategy. 376 
 377 
Our findings provide, to our knowledge, the first evidence in any species 378 
(consistent with the analogous prediction of Laland, 2004) that easily adopted heuristics, 379 
such as age-based biases, may be more readily used in decisions pertaining to the cultural 380 
transmission of information, than more cognitively challenging biases, such as those 381 
involving assessment of another’s knowledge state with regard to the task at hand. The 382 
question then is, whether an age bias is inherently more adaptive than a knowledge state 383 
bias or whether it is simply easier to evaluate? Whilst there is an argument that children 384 
may understand that self-declared knowledge states may be less reliable than age we 385 
believe it is more likely that the preference for a ‘copy adult over child’ strategy 386 
(Dugatkin & Godin, 1993) involves less cognitive processing and is a by-product of its 387 
relative ease to implement. An understanding of age develops earlier than an 388 
understanding of knowledge (Edwards 1984; Wellman et al., 2001) and thus related 389 
biases may also develop earlier.  390 
 391 
This cognitively ‘lighter’ assessment of a model’s age may, however in itself, be 392 
adaptive because adults, by their increased experience with the world, are generally more 393 
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proficient and knowledgeable models than children. Research has shown that children 394 
infer a model’s knowledge state based on his/her age (Taylor et al., 1991). Thus this 395 
correlation may lead to effective social learning strategies. However, when the 396 
correlation is contradicted, and there are instances of ignorant adults or knowledgeable 397 
children, children still rely on the age bias resulting in the current study’s finding that 398 
children are as likely to copy the irrelevant actions of an ignorant adult as a 399 
knowledgeable child. This occurs even when, as happened in the current study, every 400 
child is able to correctly identify the knowledge state of the model. To investigate these 401 
claims further it would be wise to conduct future research into children’s developing 402 
ideas of the inter-relation between age and knowledge state.  403 
  404 
The relation between these biases also helps us to understand the phenomena of 405 
copying causally irrelevant actions. Children’s selective reproduction of causally 406 
irrelevant actions suggests that this phenomenon may not be as pervasive as previously 407 
thought (Lyons et al., 2007; Nielsen & Tomaselli, 2010) in that the replication of 408 
irrelevant actions was modulated in response to a model’s characteristics. However, that 409 
is not to say that imitation of irrelevant actions can no longer be considered an 410 
evolutionary adaptation (Nielsen & Tomaselli, 2010). The copying of causally irrelevant 411 
actions may reflect a cognitively complex process within a child, involving assumptions 412 
about the ‘irrelevance’ of particular actions. For example, it would be adaptive for 413 
children to evaluate which seemingly causally irrelevant actions may be relevant actions 414 
whose causal efficacy they are yet to understand (Hernik & Csibra, 2009) versus those 415 
actions which are simply irrelevant. A wise assumption may be that adults are more 416 
likely to produce ‘irrelevant’ actions that actually have an opaque function, perhaps that 417 
of social or cultural relevance, whilst irrelevant actions from peer-aged children should 418 
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be taken at face value.  Therefore an overriding strategy of ‘adults should be imitated 419 
faithfully, children should be imitated unless their actions seem non-functional’ may be 420 
extremely beneficial, even though this heuristic may sometimes lead to the copying of 421 
irrelevant actions.  422 
High fidelity copying is a necessary factor underlying the unique capacity of 423 
humans for cumulative cultural transmission (Boyd & Richerson, 1985). Faithful 424 
imitation is the bedrock of cultural ratcheting (Tomasello, 1999) as such a 425 
phenomenon prevents any loss of knowledge, allowing for potential improvement 426 
in subsequent individual development and/or generations. Faithful imitation of causally 427 
irrelevant actions, as exhibited in this study, may appear to conflict with our 428 
species' capacity for cumulative culture due to its potential to lead to cascades of 429 
misinformation. However, the current study has demonstrated that the selective nature of 430 
children’s social learning, in copying adults over children and potentially assessing the 431 
irrelevance of apparently causally irrelevant actions, explains why a more likely result is 432 
the advancement of complex, socially learned behaviors. 433 
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Figures 578 
 579 
Figure 1. The Glass Ceiling Box (GCB) showing model performing one of the irrelevant 580 
actions. Photo from Flynn (2008) 581 
 582 
Figure 2. Mean number of irrelevant actions (out of ten) performed depending on model 583 
identity over the two trials. Asterisks indicate a difference in means more than expected 584 
between groups (* p< .05). * within a bar indicates a significant increase in irrelevant 585 
actions from T1 to T2 (p< .05).       586 
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